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LAW WITHOUT PRECEDENT: LEGAL IDEAS IN ACTION
IN THE COLONIAL COURTS OF BUSOGA. BY LLoYD
A. FALLERS. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969.
Pp. xi, 365. $12.00 hardbound.

Larry I. Palmer t
One might question the value of a well-written, yet relatively
short, scholarly work that proceeds for 100 pages before the author is
able to state explicitly that he is ready to "turn to the main business
of this study . . . . " 1 But given the controversial nature of the
literature on African customary legal systems;:~ a scholar undertakes an
enormous intellectual task if he hopes to make a major contribution to
the field of comparative legal studies. Lloyd Fallers, an anthropologist,
has made such a contribution by using the analyses of several AngloAmerican jurists 3 in his study of the legal reasoning of litigants and
judges of the colonial courts of Busoga. 4 Fallers' work is an important
contribution for legal scholars interested in interdisciplinary studies.
His book is an example of the type of integration of law and a social
science that we have come to expect in modern scholarship. His use
of legal theories and methodologies in his analysis of the social science
data is both highly sophisticated and critical. In developing his major
thesis that the Soga legal system operates as a system of social control,
"without overt communication about the application of legal conceptswithout precedent or legislation," 5 Fallers demonstrates both the applicability and the inapplicability of analyses from our legal system, with
its strong notion of precedent.£
A lawyer would be naive to rely upon the notion that he has been
trained to "get to the essence" of materials and on that rationale skip
t Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University-Camden. A.B. 1966, Harvard;
LL.B. 1969, Yale.
lL. FALLERS, LAW WITHOUT PRECEDENT: LEGAL IDEAS IN ACTION IN THE
CoLONIAL CoURTs OF BusoGA 100 (1969).
2See March,

Ma~ Ghtckmm~,

Sociologicallferisprudet~ce

Revisited, A Review (More or Less) of

8 STAN. L. REv. 499 (1956), and Gluckman's reply, id. 767.

The
author acquaints the reader with this controversy between the leading writers in the
field early in his work. L. FALLERS, stepra note 1, at 9-14.
3 E.g., H. L. HART, THE CoNCEPT oF LAW (1961) ; E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL REAsoNING (1948); K. LLEWELLYN, JuRISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1962).
4 Busoga is part of what is now Uganda.
5 L. FALLERs, supra note 1, at 312 (emphasis in original).
6 See sources cited note 3 supra.
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lightly through the first 100 pages. A thorough comprehension of
these three chapters is essential to an understanding of the results of
the cases and Fallers' analysis of them. His discussion of the relationship of the Busoga legal system to the stresses in that society during the
period of colonization is excellent.7 In particular his demonstration that
the function of the colonial courts under British rule is, in many respects, consistent with the Saga's previous system of political authority 8
may help lawyers to understand the relationship of law and legal institutions to the transformation of societies. Fallers demonstrates that
Soga litigants and judges use legal reasoning in the sense that they
employ "categorizing concepts" 9 in determining legal controversies.
Deciding that a certain course of conduct fits within a recognized concept of legal wrong among the Soga is a means of distinguishing legal
standards from merely moral ones. 10 Before the common-law trained
lawyer is able to comprehend the application of Soga legal reasoning to
the cases involving marital rights and land rights, he must understand
that law is a "cultural system"-a system of ideas-intimately linked
to the Soga social system.U
In an e..'<amination of the material 12 on marital and land rights in
the ne..'l.."t four chapters, Fallers' application of Soga legal reasoning
results, at times, in a superb synthesis of the "case law" on a particular
subject. The parameters of the concept of "sufficient reason" for
harboring a man's wife, for example, are developed from cases in a
fashion that demonstrates the law's function in Soga society.13 Although husbands have been occasionally unsuccessful in actions against
their in-laws because there was "sufficient reason" for the wife to be in
her parents' household, Fallers' synthesis of all the cases illustrates that
the legal concept of harboring without reason is used to place the
burden of keeping a marriage together on the wife and her parents.
Despite the stress of new ideas about the role of Soga women-primarily a form of cultural change-legal concepts in the marital area are
relatively stable. In a case where newer ideas about the status of
women are in conflict with traditional notions, judges are likely to be
more e..'<plicit in their legal reasoning and their disagreement about the
result, because how a particular judge will apply legal concepts to the
facts of the case depends upon his view of the status of women. 14 In the
7

L. FALLERs, supra note 1, at 1-72.

8 The author draws heavily upon his own work on political authority among the
Soga. L. FALLERS, BANTU BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF CoNFLICT AND CHANGE IN
THE PoLITICAL INsTITUTIONs oF AN EAsT AFRicAN PEOPLE (1965).
9 L. FALLERs, supra note 1, at 20. The term is borrowed from E. LEVI, supra
note 3.
10 Cf. L. FALLERS, supra note 1, at 85.
ll[d. 14.
12 In addition to the case materials selected, the author interviewed judges whom
he had met. Id. 2.
l3 I d. 156-68.
l4[d. 323.
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area of land law, Fallers' organization of the cases indicates that Saga
litigants' search for new legal concepts that protect the newer uses of
land, such as leasing, is a reflection of the increasing commercialization
of land. 15 Prior to the colonial period, the chief's authority over his
constituents was undifferentiated from his authority to allocate land.
Fallers argues that the Saga legal system needs new concepts to protect
newer land uses because differentiation of political authority and power
to allocate land represents a great social change for the Saga.
The final chapter is a comparative discussion of the distinctive
features of Saga legal reasoning. Compared to the Anglo-American
legal system, the Saga legal system is less explicit in its communication
of legal concepts, but more popular in the sense that legal concepts are
known by a large number of the populace. Not unsurprisingly the Saga
legal machinery is readily accessible to the litigants. Because the Saga
judges and bench enjoy a high degree of respect and authority, which
correlates with the degree of legalism of the court's adjudication, 16 law
performs a different function in Saga society than it performs in
other African legal systems-the Lozi/7 the Arusha/8 or the Tiv. 19
Fallers concludes with a short discussion of the implications of his work
for the attempts of leaders of independent Uganda to adapt the customary legal system to contemporary needs. 20 He shows the inappropriateness, in light of Saga legal concepts of wrongs in the marital
area, 21 of national legislation to be applied in local courts, making
adultery an offense. He suggests that the official government policy
of leaving the customary system alone would perhaps be a more effective
means of adaptation of customary law than codification (the means used
by neighboring Tanzania and Kenya) if the customary courts were
equipped with a reporting system that would tend to encourage more
explicit communication of legal concepts.22
Throughout the book, use of the present tense means the period
1950-1952, when the research was conducted. Fallers, however, makes
the reader fully aware of the relevance of this circumstance in that
there are inherent methodological problems in the use of twenty-yearold research data. He attempts to overcome as many of these problems
as possible through explicit discussion and the use of appendices, one
15Id. 224.
329-31.
17 SeeM. GLUCKMAN, THE JuDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NoRTHERN
RHODESIA (1955).
1SSee P. GuLLIVER, SociAL CoNTROL IN AN AFRICAN SociETY: A STUDY OF THE
ARUSHA: AGRICULTURAL MASAI OF NORTHERN TANGANYIKA (1963).
19 See P. BoHANNAN, JusTICE AND JuDGMENT AMONG THE Trv (1957).
20 The author's statements about post-independence politics in Uganda, L. FALLERS,
supra note 1, at 332-35, are already out of date since Major General Idi Amin led a
successful coup d'etat of the Obote government. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1971, at 1,
col. 7. This is perhaps a demonstration of the inadvisability of such statements since
his comments are relevant regardless of who heads the Uganda Government.
21 L. FALLERS, Sltpra note 1, at 334.
22Id.
16 I d.
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on Saga kinship and the other on the case records and the methods of
selection. Despite these problems, his work should be carefully studied
by American lawyers. Legal scholars in interdisciplinary areas must
begin, in their use of social science data and techniques, to match the
sophistication demonstrated by Fallers, a social scientist, in his use of
legal materials. Because Fallers' study offers a thesis to e..-..;:plain the
relationship of the change of legal concepts and social transformation,
American lawyers can use his work as a basis for formulating hypotheses about the relationship of legal and social change in our own
society.

